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Abstract 
 
Although still regarded by many as an essential feature of a truly federal 
government, the institution of the federal chamber appears to be experiencing a 
deep crisis. In all but two cases, in fact, federal chambers have shown over the 
decades an uncontrollable tendency towards centralization, to the limit that 
they now seem indistinguishable from regular, national chambers. The article 
assesses this problem from three perspectives. 1. A theoretical analysis of the 
concept of regional representation reveals that the origins of such a crisis lie in 
an intrinsic flaw of the institutional model upon which the chambers are based. 
2. An historical analysis of the birth of federal chambers, and particularly of 
their archetype, the US Senate, shows that such a flaw is due to the 
misinterpretation of two features of the latter – equal representation and 
indirect election – which have been regarded as serving to provide true regional 
representatives, when their original rationale was in fact the protection from the 
risk of factionalism. 3. Finally, an analysis of the impact of political parties on 
federalism and on federal chambers shows that a possible solution for their crisis 
lies in using them as instruments for the decentralization and destructurization 
of the party system. 
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The Paradox of Federal Bicameralism
∗ 
Giancarlo Doria 
 
 
“It is said that there must be in a Federal Government some institution, 
some authority, some body possessing a veto in which the separate 
States composing the Confederation are all equal. I confess this doctrine 
has to me no self-evidence, and it is assumed, but not proved”  
(Bagehot 1877, 162) 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the most common assumptions concerning federal government is that 
it requires the presence, within the national legislature, of two chambers: one 
representing the people, the other representing the sub-national units.
1 The 
aim of this second, federal chamber has been variously defined throughout 
history, but it has most commonly been regarded as that of providing a place 
where the regions’
2 interests can be expressed and composed with those of 
the center, so to increase the total efficacy of the governmental activity. 
Considering the diffusion of this theory, it is surprising to discover that, 
almost everywhere, federal chambers are accused of failing in performing 
their duty, and of having evolved into nationalized, party-dominated 
institutions, barely distinguishable from their popular counterparts.
3  
 
 
∗    This paper is largely based on a research which will be published on “NOMOS. Le attualità nel 
diritto”. 
1   See, e.g., Arendt Lijphart, “Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of Federal and 
Consociational Theories”, 15(2) Publius (1985), 3-15, at 3; Robert Dahl, How Democratic is the 
American Constitution? (Yale University Press, New Haven, London, 2001), 46; Schepers Stefan, Le 
Droit Fédéral en Europe (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1991), 95; Costantino Mortati, Istituzioni di Diritto 
Pubblico (Cedam, Padova, 1991), 470; Guido de Vergottini, Diritto Costituzionale Comparato 
(Cedam, Padova, 2004), 315. On the contrary, Wheare explicitly defines federal bicameralism as an 
exception to the federal rule; see Kenneth Wheare, Federal Government (Oxford University Press, 
London, 1946), 30. 
2   In the rest of the text, the term region will be used to refer generically to sub-national units. When 
discussing a specific country, the proper denomination will instead be used. 
3   Among those who have identified such a problem at a general level, see: Meg Russell, “The 
Territorial Role of the Upper House”, 7(1) The Journal Of Legislative Studies (2001), 105-118; 
Wilfried Swenden, Federalism and Second Chambers (PIE, Brussels, 2004); Jean Mastias and Jean 
Grangé, Les Secondes Chambres du Parlement en Europe Occidentale (Economica, Paris, 1987), 56; 
Adele Anzon, I Poteri delle Regioni (Giappichelli, Torino, 2003), 17-18; de Vergottini, Diritto 
costituzionale …, 315. More specifically, see for Australia, Swenden, Federalism …, 349; for Austria, 
Marco Piredda, “Il Bundesrat austriaco”, in Un Senato delle Autonomie per l’Italia Federale. Atti 
del Convegno tenuto a Roma il 20 Febbraio 2003 (ESI, Napoli, 2003), 187; for Belgium, Mastias and 
Grangé, Les Secondes Chambres …, 174-180; for Canada, C.E.S. Franks, “Not Dead Yet, But Should It 
Be Resurrected? The Canadian Senate”, in Samuel Patterson and Antony Mughan (eds.), Senates, 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu 
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This paradoxical
4 divergence between the theory and the reality of federal 
bicameralism is the object of our analysis. Before turning to that analysis, 
though, two other points need to be stressed: 
1) It is significant that, among the institutions showing the tendency 
towards centralization, we find the archetype of all federal chambers: the US 
Senate. If it is in fact commonly acknowledged that the Senate has managed 
to become one of the most powerful parliamentary assemblies of the world, it 
is also admitted that it did so essentially by betraying its alleged original 
function as the representative of the states’ interests
5 – a function which, 
ironically, is apparently better performed by the House of Representatives.
6 In 
other terms, “the Senate, simply, did not develop as a federal house”.
7 
2) Surprisingly, there are two federal chambers – the German Bundesrat 
and the Council of the European Union
8 – which have instead effectively 
performed their function (to be precise, they have done so in such a way that 
they are even accused of exerting a too federalizing impact
9). Thanks to their 
success, such chambers have been regarded by some
10 as a model that can 
provide a remedy for the crisis of federal bicameralism. Yet, their structure is 
so radically different from that of the other chambers – it is even questioned 
whether they can truly be considered parliamentary assemblies
11 – that, 
rather than a solution to the problem, this seems to be a way to hide from it. 
Furthermore, unless a conclusive answer is given to the question of why such 
 
 
Bicameralism in the Contemporary World (Ohio State University Press, Cleveland, 1999), 120-161; 
for India, Swenden, Federalism …, 349-351; for Spain, Meg Russell, Reforming the House of Lords. 
Lessons from Overseas (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000), 211. 
4   To the best of our knowledge, the first instance of the expression ‘paradox’ associated with the 
current situation of federal second chambers can be found in a very insightful analysis by Renaud 
Dehousse; to that analysis, this article expresses its debt of gratitude. See Renaud Dehousse, “Il 
paradosso di Madison: Riflessioni sul ruolo delle camere alte nei sistemi federali”, 17 Le Regioni 
(1989), 1365-1400. 
5    See Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism (University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, 1987), 181; 
William Riker, The Development of American Federalism (Kluwer, Boston, 1987), 139; Samuel 
Patterson and Anthony Mughan, “Senates and the Theory of Bicameralism”, in id. (eds.), Senates, 
Bicameralism in the Contemporary World (Ohio State University Press, Cleveland, 1999), 1-31. 
6    See Richard Fenno, The US Senate: A Bicameral Perspective (American Enterprise Institute, 
Washington, 1982). 
7   Patterson and Mughan, Senates …, 11. 
8   On the topic of whether the EU Council should be considered as a second, federal chamber, see 
George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money, Bicameralism  (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1997); Peter Norton, “How Many Bicameral Legislatures Are There?” in 10(4) The Journal of 
Legislative Studies (2004), 1-9. 
9   See, among the others, Elazar, Exploring …, 181; Werner Patzelt, “The Very Federal House: The 
German Bundesrat”, in Patterson and Mughan (eds.), Senates …, 59-92; Russell, Reforming …, 216; 
Barbara Pezzini, Il Bundesrat della Germania federale (Giuffrè, Milano, 1990). 
10   See, e.g., Swenden, Federalism …, 349; Carlos Juberias, “A House in Search of a Role: The Senado 
of Spain Patterson and Mughan (eds.), Senates …, 293; Lorenza Violini, Bundesrat e Camera delle 
regioni, due modelli alternativi a confronto (Giuffrè, Milano, 1989), 10. 
11   The Constitutional Tribunal of Germany has answered in the negative in a crucial decision of 1975. 
Although the Tribunal’s arguments were based on strictly textual considerations, they echoed the 
results of a majority of German scholars, particularly those of Friesenhahn. See Mastias and Grangé, 
Les Secondes …, 116-117. 
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chambers have been so effective – and the others so ineffective – there is a 
serious risk that the mere exportation of their structure to other countries 
could not only leave the latter’s problems unsolved, but even create new 
ones. 
This article explores the paradox of federal bicameralism in its theoretical 
and historical implications, aiming to provide its explanation and to propose 
its possible solution. In order to arrive to that solution, the study will not be 
limited to the level of institutional dynamics, but will also consider the role of 
the actors which give life to those dynamics: political parties. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. Paragraphs 2 shows that there exist two 
models of federal bicameralism, each based on a different interpretation of 
the concept of regional representation. The senatorial model interprets it in 
the sense of a political representation of federated communities; originally 
invented in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, this model is now spread all 
around the world. The ambassadorial model, instead, interprets the concept 
in the sense of a juridical representation of federated governments; 
developed on the basis of the institutional structure of ancient confederal 
diets, it is nowadays only applied in Germany and in the EU. 
Paragraph 3 shows that the crisis of the federal chambers is in fact more 
precisely a crisis of the senatorial model. It also reveals that its causes do not 
lie in contingent factors, but in an intrinsic flaw of the model, i.e. the 
impossibility to ensure a representation of status simply through the means of 
elections. 
Paragraph 4 examines the origins of the senatorial model in the US. It 
arrives to the conclusion that the Framers designed an institution intrinsically 
unfit to work as a clearing house for the states’ interests because they did not 
originally interpret the Senate as aimed to perform that function. The model 
on which the Senate was based had in fact to do much more with the theory 
of mixed government than with federalism; it was only later, when the 
original rationale had become politically unsustainable, that the federal 
explanation was conceived. 
Paragraph 5 turns to the relation between federalism, federal bicameralism 
and the party system. It shows that: 1. ambassadorial chambers tend to 
entangle the regional and central party structures, with the effect of 
curtailing either the central or the regional autonomy; in either case, they 
exert an undeniably negative impact on the functionality of federalism; 
2.  senatorial chambers instead can – under certain conditions – perform a 
strong decentralizing and destructuralizing function, by offering the regional 
political personnel a national outlet for its ambitions. 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu 
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Paragraph 6 examines the conditions under which it is possible for the 
senatorial chamber to work as an effective instrument for the 
decentralization and destructuralization of the party system. Such conditions 
are identified with a truly regional election and a true autonomy from 
political parties for the chamber’s members. 
The concluding paragraph proposes two possible solutions to the crisis and 
shows how each of them represents the application of a different 
interpretation of federalism. 
2. One Chamber, Two Models 
What is a federal chamber? The comparative analysis of the several 
institutions which go by this name does not help us find an answer: the level 
of differentiation between them is such that it could even be questioned 
whether they truly constitute a unitary category. In particular, of the 
eighteen existing federal chambers
12: 
•  seven are directly elected by the people (among the others: the US after 
1913, Australia, South American countries and de facto Switzerland), five 
are chosen by regional legislatures (the US before 1913, Austria, India, 
Malaysia, South Africa), two are variously linked to the regional executives 
(Germany, the EU) and two are based on a combination of these methods 
(Belgium, Spain); 
•  in eleven cases regions are equally represented, regardless of their 
population (among the others: the U.S., South American countries, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Malaysia and de facto Switzerland and Australia), in three 
representation follows proportionally population (Austria, India, Belgium) 
and in four a median criterion is used (Canada, Germany, the EU and de 
facto Spain); 
•  finally, in most countries the term of office is fixed, although sometimes 
staggered; in four cases, instead, it depends on that of the regional 
executive or legislature (Germany, Austria, the EU, South Africa).
13 
 
If the comparative analysis proves unhelpful, the theoretical examination 
seems to be even more problematic. To some extent, it is quite obvious that, 
on a theoretical level, a federal chamber is simply a chamber which provides 
 
 
12    The analysis is based on Samuel Patterson and Anthony Mughan, “Fundamentals of Institutional 
Design, the Functions and Powers of Parliamentary Second Chambers”, in 7(1) The Journal Of 
Legislative Studies (2001), 39-59; Coakley John and Laver Michael, “Options for the Future of the 
Seanad Èireann”, The All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution. Second Progress Report 
(Government of Ireland, Dublin, 1997); Russell, Reforming …, 23. 
13   On the institutional differences between the several federal chambers, see Robert Borthwick, 
“Methods of Composition of Second Chambers”, 7(1) The Journal Of Legislative Studies (2001), 
19-26; Russell, “The Territorial Role …”; Patterson and Mughan, Fundamentals …; Ronald Watts, 
“Federal Second Chambers Compared”, federalismi.it (2006), at http://www.federalismi.it. 
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a representation of federated states. But what does this mean? If we analyze 
the terms which compose the expression (representation and federated 
states), we discover that both present at least two different meanings. 
1) Representation, as it is commonly known, assumes a different meaning 
depending on whether it is used in its juridical or in its political sense.
14 
Juridical representation is the relation (founded either on the will of the 
represented or on the law) which entitles somebody to exercise some of the 
rights of somebody else. Such a relation presupposes that the will of the 
represented – although absent – is still existent, at the very least in concept; 
as a consequence, this will can be used as a meter to evaluate the conduct of 
the representative. It is in this sense that we say that an attorney represents 
a firm or that an ambassador represents a country. 
But this is not what we mean when we say that the members of a 
legislative body represent the people, since, at the very least, there is no will 
of the people per se (i.e. outside the representational relation). This absence 
implies that there is no objective meter upon which the conduct of the 
representative can be evaluated, and therefore requires the use of some 
device to ensure the existence of at least some degree of correspondence 
between representatives and represented: this device is the electoral process. 
Of course, the correspondence which is created through the electoral process 
differs in nature from that which is presupposed by juridical representation: it 
is in fact not a correspondence of wills, but one of interests. In other terms, 
elections make it useful for the representatives to conform to the interests of 
the represented, because of the sanction of non-reelection. In this sense, it is 
said that if juridical representation comes down to mandate, political 
representation comes down to accountability. 
2) Federated state, on its part, can either mean a community – or a people, 
although we will see that such an expression is not appropriate for a sub-
national unit – or its government, i.e. the apparatus which the community sets 
up to provide for the general interest. To our ends, it is important to consider 
that the two differ deeply with regards to the problem of having a will; if in 
fact, as we have just said, a community (or a people) per se does not have a 
will, quite obviously instead a government can shape, have and express a will. 
 
 
 
14   The analysis draws on Giovanni Sartori, Elementi di teoria politica (Il Mulino, Bologna, 1987), 285. A 
different approach, which nonetheless confirms our theses, can be found in Hanna Pitkin, The 
Concept of Representation (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967). Pitkin’s distinction 
between delegates and representatives tout court more or less overlaps with Sartori’s distinction 
between representatives in the juridical and in the political sense. 
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In light of this, what do we mean when we say that the federal chambers’ 
members are the representatives of the federated states? Are they 
ambassadors or normal legislators? Do they represent the federated 
communities or the federated governments? To begin with, we can rule out 
two possible answers, for they are contradictory: 
a) such representatives cannot be ambassadors of the federated 
communities. In fact, as we said, juridical representation requires the 
existence of two wills, but the federated community per se does not have a 
will; 
b) they cannot be political representatives of the federated governments. 
This can sound a little less obvious, but can be put this way: to be a political 
representative of a government simply means being accountable to it; at the 
same time, though, governments – at least, democratic governments – are 
accountable to their communities; as a consequence, since the relation of 
accountability is clearly transitive (if a is accountable to b and b to c, then a 
is accountable to c), the representative automatically becomes a 
representative of the community. 
If this is so, we are left with only two possible meanings of the idea of 
representing the federated states: 
a) the chamber’s members can be political representatives of the several 
federated communities. In this case, the chamber is similar to a regular 
parliamentary assembly, whose members represent the people in the sense 
that they are accountable to the electorate. Of course, rather than the whole 
nation, the members of a federal chamber represent the specific community 
of the region from which they come. We will call this a senatorial chamber; 
b) the chamber’s members can be juridical representatives of the several 
federated governments. As a consequence, such members are completely 
different from regular legislators, for they are not required to autonomously 
shape their wills, and to be later judged by the electorate; the wills they 
express, instead, count because (and insofar as) they can be referred to those 
of the governments they represent. Since the nature of such members clearly 
resembles that of ambassadors, we will call this an ambassadorial chamber. 
To which of the above theoretical models can actual federal chambers be 
referred? A comparative analysis reveals that there is no single answer: the 
great majority of them can more or less easily be described as senatorial 
chambers, yet two adopt quite explicitly the ambassadorial model. 
In other terms, so, as we had provisionally stated before, federal chambers 
apparently do not constitute a unitary category; on the contrary, two, 
radically different institutions go by this name. It is therefore absolutely 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu 
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essential that, prior to our analysis of the functionality of second chambers, 
we analyze each institutions separately, discussing their nature, history and 
most essential features. 
2.1. The Senatorial Model 
The members of senatorial chambers are required to shape their wills 
autonomously from the federated communities they represent or their 
governments. Therefore, they cannot be either instructed or interfered with 
in any legally relevant way. In this respect, the relation that such members 
enjoy with their communities is similar – although not identical – to the one 
between members of political chambers and the people at large. 
In light of this definition, we must include within this category all the 
chambers which satisfy both of the following conditions: 
a)    their members are required (under the terms of the national 
constitution, or de facto) to represent only and specifically the regional 
communities which elect them. This rules out institutions – such as the French 
Sénat or the Italian Senato – whose elections are linked to regional 
communities, but whose members are not required to represent such 
communities (in the case of the Italian Senato, they are actually required not 
to represent them). Since this condition is of course necessary also for a 
chamber to be considered ambassadorial, we can simply say that such 
institutions are not federal chambers. 
b)   their members are either: 
i) directly elected by the regional communities – for in this case there is no 
doubt that the relation is one of political nature; 
ii) elected by one of the bodies of the regional governments (usually the 
legislatures), if and only if these body does not possess any instrument to 
impose their wills over those of the representatives. In the absence of such 
instruments, in fact, this merely constitutes a form of indirect election (i.e. 
the chosen representatives are not called to represent the body which chose 
them, but the regional community at large). 
Having laid out the basic concepts concerning the senatorial chamber, let 
us now turn to the history of the model. 
Most institutions emerge gradually throughout history, by a process of 
progressive accretion or imperceptible adaptation; usually, therefore, it is 
extremely hard to trace down their origins. This is not the case with the 
senatorial chamber: the idea according to which the members of the federal 
chamber must be political representatives of the federated communities did 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu 
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not simply progressively emerge from the mists of history; it was consciously 
invented in a precise historical moment. 
That moment was the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. During the works of 
the Convention, in fact, the Framers of the US Constitution, having apparently 
decided to set up a chamber within the national legislature through which the 
several states could be represented, consciously rejected the principle – 
common to the existing confederal diets – that its members were to be 
ambassadors of the states (and consequently subjected to instruction and 
recall). Instead, they intentionally resorted to a different principle, that of 
political representation of federated communities, and created therefore a 
completely new institution. 
But the US Senate is not only the first instance of a senatorial chamber; its 
role is instead much greater, for it is quite commonly accepted
15 that it is 
precisely thanks to the fame and fortune of this venerable institution that so 
many other countries decided to adopt a federal chamber, and a senatorial 
chamber in particular. In other terms, the US Senate was not only the 
archetype, but also the prototype
16 of the senatorial chambers. 
That the example set by the US Senate played a fundamental role in the 
adoption and worldwide diffusion of senatorial chambers is a crucial passage 
in our analysis. It is therefore important to immediately counter a possible 
objection: i.e. that, as important as the example set by the US Senate was, it 
is not because of it that so many countries adopted a federal, senatorial 
chamber. 
After all – so would the argument go – during the 19
th century, when the 
diffusion of the institution began, many theorists of federalism maintained 
that the presence of a chamber of regional representation was an essential 
feature of a truly federal government; it is therefore likely that the countries 
adopting a senatorial chamber did so primarily because of those theories 
rather than because they were imitating the US example. 
This objection cannot be accepted. To understand why, we must focus on 
the precise basis upon which those theorists claimed that a federal chamber 
was essential for a federal government. Such a basis was the idea, extremely 
common during the 19
th century, that federalism was some kind of median 
form of government between a unitary state and a confederation. This idea, 
on its part, had been developed essentially out of the attempt of the 
 
 
15   On the importance of the U.S. model, see Tsebelis and Money, Bicameralism …, 31; more 
specifically, see John Uhr, “Generating Divided Government: the Australian Senate”, in Patterson 
and Mughan, Senates …, 31, for Switzerland; and Franks, “Not Dead Yet …”, 120, for Canada. 
16   See Tania Groppi, Il Federalismo (Laterza, Roma, 2004), 123. 
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European legal doctrine to approach the new phenomenon of federalism 
through the lens of its traditional theoretical categories, particularly of 
sovereignty. So, if within a confederation the sovereignty belonged to the 
peripheral entities, and within a unitary state it belonged to the center, a 
federal government was somewhere in the middle, with the sovereignty 
divided in one way or another between the periphery and the center.
17 
This being so, it seemed all but normal that the federal state’s legislature 
(i.e. the locus par excellence of manifestation of the sovereignty) had to be 
composed of the sum of the two organs which were typical respectively of a 
unitary state (a national chamber) and of a confederation (a council of 
ambassadors). Significantly, the first formulation of this thesis can be found in 
the Federalist no. 39 (Madison):  
The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of 
America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion and on 
the same principle as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far, 
the government is national, not federal. The Senate, on the other hand, will 
derive its powers from the States as political and coequal societies; and these 
will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they are 
now in the existing Congress. So far, the government is federal, not 
national”.
18 
Now: if the reason why so many countries adopted federal bicameralism 
truly was that they deemed it necessary to replicate within their national 
legislature the two supreme organs of a unitary state and of a confederation, 
the problem is: why did virtually all of them (all of them but Germany) build a 
senatorial rather than an ambassadorial chamber? In fact, all confederacies 
had adopted as their supreme bodies chambers composed of the states’ 
ambassadors (instructable and recallable). 
In other terms, if the double-nature theory had been the true reason for 
the diffusion of bicameralism, we would live in a world with many 
ambassadorial chambers and very few, if any, senatorial chambers. Since the 
opposite is true, some other force was there which made it possible for the 
senatorial model to have the diffusion it had. This force, quite clearly, was 
the example set by the US Senate. 
In conclusion, it is primarily thanks to the success of the US Senate that the 
senatorial model was adopted in the other federal countries: Mexico, 
 
 
17   On the topic, see Guido Lucatello, Lo Stato federale (Cedam, Padova, 1939). 
18   Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (edited by Clinton 
Rossiter, Penguin, New York, 2003), 241. 
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Switzerland, Argentina, Brazil and Australia, during the 19
th century
19; Austria, 
India, Pakistan, Belgium, Malaysia, Spain and South Africa during the 20
th 
century. Interestingly, it should be noted that even Germany – which, as we 
will see, is the homeland of the ambassadorial model – was not completely 
immune from the allure of the US solution. In particular, the US Senate 
exerted a great influence on the Paulskirche Convention of 1848: the 
Staatenhaus of the never applied Constitution of Frankfurt was in fact 
composed of members which – contrary to the German tradition – were 
completely free from any form of instruction.
20 
2.2 The Ambassadorial Model 
Within ambassadorial chambers, the members’ wills do not count per se – as 
autonomously shaped and freely expressed – but because they correspond 
(and only insofar as they correspond) to those of the regional governments 
they represent. In this sense, such members resemble ambassadors. 
This definition raises a problem: how could such a correspondence be 
achieved? Tree instruments have been used to this end: 
a) the mandate. The mandate is an order which the regional executive – or, 
less likely, legislative – gives to the chamber’s member for each single 
deliberation. The representative has simply to report the region’s will; 
consequently, in the case of a discordance, his vote is null. The German 
Bundesrath of years 1867 to 1918 openly adopted this solution, clearly 
indicating (Article 7 of the Constitution of 1871) that a vote contrary to the 
instruction would not count; 
b) the instruction. The instruction is an indication through which the region 
expresses its will on a specific matter. Although the representative is not 
legally bound to follow it (and consequently his vote is not null in the case of 
a discordance), the regional government can enforce it over the recalcitrant 
representative by recalling him. This method – as we will later see – was used 
by some southern states of the US at the middle of 19
th Century, as an 
application of the so-called doctrine of instructions; 
c) the personal union of seats. This method resolves the correspondence 
problem by unifying the wills: the seat in the federal chamber is granted to an 
organ of the region which has the right to express the regional will (such as 
the head of the government). This is the model which best describes the 
 
 
19   Canada should be added to this list. In fact, although the Senate is partially based on the British 
model (its members are chosen by the Governor General on the proposal of the Prime Minister), it 
was considered ever since its creation as a way of giving representation to the federal interests. See 
Tania Groppi, Canada (Il Mulino, Bologna, 2005), 84. 
20   Peter Merkl, The Origins of West German Republic (Oxford University Press, New York, 1963), 80. 
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institutional structure of the Council of the European Union; the current 
German Bundesrat is instead based on a not completely defined mixture of 
methods a and c. 
If the presence of one of such instruments is at the same time a sufficient 
and a necessary condition for describing a chamber as ambassadorial, two 
other features usually accompany them: 
a) the block vote. We define block vote the requirement that each regional 
delegation expresses a common ballot in every deliberation. The presence of 
this feature is a necessary condition for defining a chamber as ambassadorial: 
in fact, if the representatives’ wills only count insofar as they can be referred 
to those of the regions, and since a region cannot have two wills, it comes as 
a consequence that two representatives of the same region cannot express 
different wills. At the same time, this is by no means a sufficient condition for 
defining a chamber as ambassadorial: for example, it was used during the 
Philadelphia Convention, whose members were definitively not ambassadors; 
b) the changeable composition. We have a changeable composition when 
the Constitution prescribes that the assembly can be composed in different 
ways depending on the different topics of the discussion. This institution 
brings to its extreme consequences the tendency, which is proper to every 
ambassadorial chamber, to destroy the figure itself of the “chamber’s 
member”; this phenomenon is particularly visible for the German Bundesrat, 
in which the will of the region is usually expressed by the so-called 
Stimmführer, a single delegate who carries all the votes of the Land.
21 
Contrary to the block vote, the changeable composition is clearly a sufficient, 
but not a necessary condition for defining a chamber as ambassadorial. 
Ambassadorial chambers are far from common: the only institutions which 
satisfy the above conditions are the German Bundesrat, the EU Council and – 
according to some
22 – the South African National Council and the Russian 
Council of the Federation.
23 
 
 
21   Mastias and Grangé, Les secondes chambers …, 109 defines the Bundesrat as a “chamber without 
members”. 
22   See Russell, “The Territorial Role …”, 117. 
23   In the rest of the text we will focus just on the first two, not only because of their importance, but 
also because the classification of the others as ambassadorial chambers is disputable. As for the 
Russian Council of Federation, a comparison with the other institutions is improper because of the 
peculiar political situation of the country (furthermore, after the institutional change of 2000, it is 
disputable that it can still be considered as an ambassadorial chamber). 
  As for the South African National Council, instead, the idea of its similarity with the Bundesrat 
seems altogether dismissible. Created in 1997, the National Council is composed of ten delegates 
from each provinces: the Prime Ministers, plus 6 members elected by the legislature for a whole 
term and 3 who sit in rotation; every delegation cast a single ballot, and all the members can be 
recalled. These features do not seem sufficient to ascribe the institution to the ambassadorial 
model. In fact: 1) the right of recall does not serve to impose the will of the provincial legislatures 
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The first example of a bicameral legislature with an ambassadorial chamber 
can be found in Germany, with the creation in 1867 of the Bundesrath of the 
Norddeutscher Bund. The Bundesrath’s members were bound to follow the 
instructions of their governments (otherwise their vote was null); they were 
protected by diplomatic immunity, and enjoyed the title of His Excellence, 
which was typical of ambassadors. These features passed almost untouched to 
the Weimar Republic’s Reichsrat and to the current Bundesrat.
24 
It hardly follows, though, that the ambassadorial model was invented by 
the German legislators of 1867, at least in the same way that the senatorial 
model was invented by the American Philadelphia Convention of 1787. 
German legislators, in fact, inherited the idea of making the federal 
chamber’s members juridical representatives of the federated government 
from an institution, the diet of ambassadors, which was extremely common 
within ancient and modern Confederations. From the Swiss confederation 
(1291-1798; 1815- 1848) to the Dutch United Provinces (1579-1795), to the 
United States between 1778 and 1787, all confederation had in fact been 
ruled by diets composed by the ambassadors of the confederated states or 
directly by their rulers.
25 It was thus primarily by looking at this tradition – and 
particularly at the Diet of Regensburg, operating within the German Holy 
Roman Empire between1663 and 1806; and at the Diet of Frankfurt, operating 
from 1815 to 1848, and then again from 1848 to 1866 – that the Norddeutscher 
Bund developed its Bundesrath. 
To prove this point, it is significant that, when in 1867 Germany gave its 
final shape to the model, the ambassadorial principle had already found an 
ante litteram application in the US Senate at the middle of the 19
th century. 
At that time, in fact, the US southern states began to uphold the so-called 
“doctrine of instructions”, according to which state legislatures, which 
elected senators, also retained the right to instruct them and – if needed – to 
recall them.
26 The argument went as follows: since the Senator was to 
represent the state, i.e. the state’s will, and since the state’s legislature was 
the true depository of that will, it came as a consequence that, should any 
 
 
over their representatives; it is instead an instrument in the hands of political parties, which, under 
the explicit terms of the Constitution, are the true holders of the Council seats; 2) the Constitution 
prescribes that members of the provincial legislatures who are chosen as permanent members of 
the Council must resign; a prevision that clearly contrast the idea of creating a link between the 
two levels; 3) as it has already been stated, the sole prescription of the block vote does not 
constitute a sufficient reason for considering a chamber as ambassadorial. In the end, the National 
Council seems much closer to the South African tradition of corporative second chambers than to 
the ambassadorial model. 
24   For an insightful analysis on the topic, see Francesco Palermo, Germania ed Austria, Modelli 
federali e bicamerali a confronto (Università degli Studi di Trento, Trento, 1997); Barbara Pezzini, 
Il Bundesrat della Germania federale (Giuffrè, Milano, 1990); Fulco Lanchester, Le costituzioni 
tedesche da Francoforte a Bonn (Giuffrè, Milano, 2002), 35-38. 
25   See Tsebelis and Money, Bicameralism …, 31-32; Pezzini, Il Bundesrat …; Violini, Bundesrat …, 23. 
26   Riker, The Development …, 149; Ross Baker, House and Senate (Norton, New York, 1989), 41-42. 
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differences between the two occur, the latter had the right to remove the 
former as no longer performing his duty. 
This doctrine, however, did not prevail; it found some applications during 
the second quarter of the 19
th century, but was abandoned altogether after 
the Civil War. Yet, if it had prevailed, it would have clearly made the US 
Senate the first concrete example of an ambassadorial chamber. Anyway, the 
emergence of such a theory at least twenty years before the creation of the 
German  Bundesrath proves the point we made above: the ambassadorial 
model was not created in 1867; it simply found its first application then. As 
we will see, this conclusion is of the greatest importance for the rest of our 
analysis. 
3. A Crisis of the Senatorial Model 
Paragraph 2 shows that the federal chamber is not a unitary category, but one 
which includes two different modulations: the ambassadorial model, adopted 
by Germany and the EU; and the senatorial model, adopted by all of the other 
federal countries. 
If we confront these results with the data provided in paragraph  1 
concerning the diffusion of the federal chambers’ crisis, an interesting point 
clearly emerges: the line between ambassadorial and senatorial chambers 
perfectly overlaps with the one between the chambers that have and have not 
experienced such a crisis. Consequently, it is only natural to ask: is it possible 
that this crisis does not depend on a generic problem of the federal chambers, 
but on a specific flaw of the senatorial model? 
This paragraph addresses this question and answers it in the positive, by 
showing the existence of a link between the assumptions upon which the 
senatorial chambers rest and their degeneration into fully nationalized, party-
dominated institutions. 
As we have seen in paragraph 2, the senatorial model interprets the 
concept of regional representation as a form of political representation of 
federated communities. At that level we could be satisfied with this 
definition, for we simply wanted to stress the difference between that 
interpretation and the one offered by the ambassadorial model; but what 
exactly does it mean? What is it exactly that the member of the senatorial 
chamber represents? 
The most obvious answer, that he represents the regional people, is 
unacceptable. The concept of people cannot be applied to a region, unless 
one wants to reject the consolidated idea of the unitary nature of the federal 
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state.
27 Yet, since political representation necessarily requires some form of 
unity between those who are represented, we need to find something else, 
other than the concept of people, which can provide such a unity. 
The best solution seems to be offered by the idea of a representation of 
status. A status can be defined as the way under which the law regards an 
individual as a holder of specific interests in his quality of member of a 
specific group or category. In contemporary states, the status is the base upon 
which groups such as denominations or nationalities find their relevance in 
front of the law; in fact, because of the individualistic assumptions of modern 
philosophy, fundamental rights cannot be granted to groups per se, and are 
therefore given to individuals regarded under their status of members of those 
groups. 
Regional affiliation (being a Californian, a Bavarian, etc.) clearly qualifies 
as one of such statuses. Specifically, it is a status to which certain 
governments – the federal ones – attach a particular importance, but which is 
in principle undistinguishable from the others; so that, for instance, a 
corporative government can instead attach more importance to the status of 
somebody’s job position.
28 
It is on this concept that the idea of a regional representation can best and 
most solidly be based. In this sense, representing a regional community would 
mean representing a specific number of citizens, but considering them only 
with respect to the specific status of their regional belonging (not with 
respect to the complex of their interests). In other terms, it is as if the 
representative were wearing a pair of colored glasses, filtering all but one of 
the people’s characteristics. 
If this is so, though, a problem emerges. When we discussed political 
representation in general we said that the means to ensure the needed 
correspondence between the representatives and the people is the general 
election; but the matter is much worse with a representation of status. In this 
case, in fact, the representative is not only required to 1) conform to the 
interests of the represented, but also – and at least as fundamentally – to 
2) only represent them under the specific status of their regional belonging. 
 
 
27   If there truly were a regional people, i.e. a regional entity with a general interest, such an entity 
would necessarily have the right to evaluate whether each decision taken at the central level 
conforms or not to that interest. In the latter case, the region could lawfully decide not to enforce 
that decision, a result which clearly conflicts with the unitary nature of a federal government. 
28   A certain similarity between federalism and corporativism has been acknowledged by Arendt 
Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (Yale University Press, New Haven, London, 1999). A striking proof 
of this relation, which specific reference to the topic of second chambers, can be offered by the 
South-African transition from a corporative (ethnic) bicameralism to a federal bicameralism during 
the 90s. 
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Unfortunately, if the first goal can be achieved through the simple means 
of the elections, the second cannot. The only instrument which can guarantee 
that the representative does not put down his colored glasses is the nature of 
the activity which he is called to perform: if this activity only involves the 
people’s regional statuses, he will act as if he were only considering the 
regional belonging of the represented; if instead such an activity involves the 
people’s general interest, he will surely not, for the simple, obvious reason 
that he will have no interest to do it. 
Unfortunately, this is precisely what happens within senatorial chambers 
(contrary, for instance, to the regional assemblies ruling a particular 
territory): their members are required to perform a representation of status, 
but at the same time to operate within a field where the whole set of the 
people’s interests are involved. 
The consequence, quite unsurprisingly, is that the representative inevitably 
stops considering the members of its regional community under the specific 
status of their regional belonging, and starts to look at them with respect to 
the all of their interests. Consequently, the chamber loses its regionalized 
shape. Regional groups start to crumble, and new groups emerge, based on 
lines which depend on the specific profiles that electors consider to be the 
most relevant (religion, economic interests, international collocation). On 
average, so, unless such profiles are specifically those related to the regional 
affiliation (but in this case, the whole national politics will be structured 
around the regional cleavage), the groups will most likely be structured 
according to political ideologies, i.e. the profiles which – because of their all-
inclusiveness – best reflect the subdivisions of the electorate. 
In conclusion, so, the evolution of the senatorial chambers into 
nationalized, party-dominated institutions is by no means accidental; it 
depends instead on a theoretical flaw of the senatorial model. If this is so, 
one may ask: how is it possible that such an intrinsically flawed model found 
such an incredible diffusion? To this question we must now turn. 
4. Philadelphia or the Origins of Federal Bicameralism 
Paragraph 3 closes with a question: since we have shown that the senatorial 
chamber is intrinsically (not accidentally) unable to work as a clearing house 
for state interests, how can we explain that so many countries adopted that 
model precisely in order to have it perform that function? 
To this question, to some extent, we have already answered: we have in 
fact shown that the reason of the diffusion of the senatorial model essentially 
lies in the strength of the example set by the US Senate. Yet, this answer is 
not fully satisfactory, for it almost automatically raises another question: 
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then, why did the US Framers themselves adopt such a flawed model? This 
paragraph aims to provide an answer, by showing that: 
a) the Framers did not develop the senatorial model by either accident or 
mistake; instead, they purposely chose to use the existing institutional 
material, which would have led them towards the ambassadorial solution; 
b) they did so because they did not primarily intend the Senate as the 
manifestation of the confederal root of the Union, as they later claimed. In 
fact, although this idea appears in the Federalist Papers, it does not reflect 
either the real intention of the Federalists (particularly of James Madison) or 
the true will of the Framers; it was elaborated only after the conclusion of 
the Philadelphia Convention, essentially as a polemical reply to the 
Antifederalists’ attacks against the upper chamber; 
c) the true rationale which led the Framers to build the Senate – not just a 
Senate, but that Senate – had originally to do not with federalism but with the 
theory of mixed government, and, more specifically, with the madisonian idea 
of the necessity of a protection against the risk of factionalism. 
We will in sum show that the US Senate became a full-fledged 
parliamentary assembly not because the Framers’ device did not work, but 
because it worked, and worked extremely well. 
4.1. The Framers Intentionally Rejected 
 the Ambassadorial Solution 
Why did the Framers choose the ineffective senatorial model over the 
effective ambassadorial one? One answer could be that they simply lacked the 
institutional material necessary to adopt the latter solution and were 
consequently bound to resort to the former. This answer is simply wrong: not 
only did the Framers have all that was necessary to build an ambassadorial 
chamber; even more, this choice should have been for them the most natural 
one. 
As we have already noted in Paragraph 2, the theory, first advanced by 
James Madison, according to which the Senate was to be the embodiment of 
the confederal root of the Union, leads to a paradox within the paradox. This 
explanation, in fact, depicts the Senate as nothing less than an heir of the 
Congress, the organ which had ruled the former colonies under the Articles of 
Confederation between 1781 and 1787. Nonetheless, if we confront the 
features of the Senate with those of its alleged ancestor, we discover a 
striking number of dissimilarities, which invest basically every feature of the 
institution: congressmen were elected every year, senators every six; 
congressmen were paid by the states, senators by the Union; congressmen 
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voted per state, senators per capita; congressmen could be instructed, 
senators could not; congressmen could be recalled, senators could not. 
The idea of a Senate heir of a Congress, in other terms, simply does not 
work. If the Framers had truly wanted the Senate to represent the confederal 
root of the Union, they had but one option: to make it an ambassadorial 
chamber. To do so, they should have adopted even only some of the features 
of the Confederal Congress, such as the right of instruction and recall; but 
when the Anti-federalists advanced those proposals, the majority of the 
Convention simply turned them down. 
Of course, one could object that, at the very least, the Convention still 
maintained the principles of equal regional representation (E.R.R. in the 
acronym coined by Wilfred Swenden
29) and of the election by the state 
legislatures. Yet, both were only seeming concessions to the confederal 
principle.
30 Equal representation would in fact do nothing more than favor the 
small states.
31 The election by the state legislature, on its part, could not 
create any sufficient link between senators and the states, both because of 
the lack of the right of instruction and recall, and because the Senators’ long 
term (6 years) shielded them from any interference from their electors 
(whose terms were usually of 2 years; furthermore, since the senatorial 
elections usually followed those of the legislatures, the senators almost never 
faced the same institution which would later judge them). 
4.2. The Framers Did Not Want a Clearing House  
for States’ Interests 
Sub-paragraph 4.1. describes the terms of a paradox within the paradox. 
Apparently, the Framers: 1) wanted an institution which represented the 
confederal branch of the new government; 2) had at their disposal all that 
was necessary to create an ambassadorial chamber, which would have been 
perfectly in line with that function; 3) rejected instead that path and decided 
instead to create a senatorial chamber, patently unable to work to that end. 
Quite obviously, one of these assumptions must be false; and, since the 
ones under 2) and 3) are factual elements, the false one cannot be but the 
first one. In other terms, although they said so, the Framers did not want an 
institution which represented the confederal branch of the new government. 
They did not want any such thing as an heir of the old Congress. 
 
 
29   Swenden, Federalism … . 
30   Riker, The Development …, 30-31. 
31   To be sure, the four-sided states, according to the accurate reconstruction of Frances Lee and Bruce 
Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation (University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999), 34. 
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This is precisely the conclusion to which Gordon S. Wood arrives in his 
analysis of the cultural and institutional factors beneath the creation of the 
American republic.
32 According to Wood, the original rational of the Senate 
was not that of representing the confederal branch of the Union; this 
explanation was conceived by Madison and the Federalists only after the 
closure of the Philadelphia Convention, to shield their creature from the harsh 
criticisms coming from the Antifederalists’ field. Since this episode is the 
turning point of the history of federal bicameralism, it is useful to analyze it 
in greater detail. 
During the ratification of the Constitution, the Senate had begun to be the 
center of the attacks of the Antifederalists – the supporters of a weakly 
centralized government – who claimed that this institution was one of the 
most prominent examples of the alleged centralistic and aristocratic 
inspiration beneath the Federalists’ design. According to the Antifederalists, 
in fact, through the Senate – the true pivot of the new system – a small group 
of men would control the future of the whole continent. Particularly under 
attack were features such as the indirect election, the small number of 
members, the long tenure of office, and the special competences. 
Since such accusations were finding a fertile ground in the Whig ideology 
pervading most of American public opinion, the Federalists needed to find a 
new basis for the justification of the Senate. The idea of its being the heir of 
the Confederal Congress was a perfect candidate for such a justification, 
since it combined the two accusations of the Antifederalists and turned them 
against them. To do so, the Federalists (particularly James Madison and James 
Wilson) began to slightly change in their political writings the meaning of 
some of the most fundamental features of the institution. In particular: 
a) the election by the state legislatures, originally developed as a means to 
keep the chamber autonomous from the House and still grant it a democratic 
foundation,
33 began to mean that senators would be the defenders of the 
states within the new government; 
b) the equal representation clause, originally nothing more than a political 
compromise, with no theoretical significance,
34 came to be the symbol of the 
retention of some portion of sovereignty in the hands of the States;
35 
 
 
32   Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (University of North Carolina Press, Charlotte, 
1969). 
33   See Lee and Oppenheimer, Sizing Up …, 24. 
34   See Madison, quoted in Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, London, 1913), 111. 
35   See Lee and Oppenheimer, Sizing Up …, 34. 
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c) finally, the special competences became the sign that the confederal 
root of the new government had the prevalence over the unitary one, 
represented by the House (whose only prominence over the Senate regarded 
the very specific field of money bills, “a trifle light as air”, as it was defined 
by James Wilson
36). 
In the words of Wood: “The Federalists found a justification for the upper 
house that they had not anticipated. ‘The people will be represented in one 
house, the state legislatures in the other’, the Federalists said time and again 
in explanation of the establishment of bicameralism in the new Congress. The 
Senate now became a means of restraining ‘the large states from having 
improper advantage over the small ones’. Indeed – many Federalists could 
now argue – precisely because ‘the senators represent the sovereignty of the 
states’, the consolidation predicted by the Antifederalists could never 
result.”
37 
Ironically, the one who granted this disguising reinterpretation such a fame 
that it displaced once and for all the original ratio of the Senate, was that 
same James Madison who had been the strongest opponent of both election by 
state legislatures and equal representation. Which is a final proof of how far 
was the idea of the Senate as the representative of the confederal principle 
from the mind of those who actually designed the Senate, when they actually 
designed it.  
4.3 What the Framers Wanted 
If Wood is right, then what originally was the Senate for the Federalists? The 
answer can be best given through the words of Elaine Swift
38: it was to be an 
American House of Lords. This did not mean, though, that the Antifederalists 
were right in saying that what the Federalists wanted was an institution to 
protect the American burgeoning aristocracy: it is not in this sense that they 
referred to the British example. Let us enlarge on this topic. 
At the end of the 18
th century, the protection of the aristocracy had long 
stopped being the most common justification for the House of Lords; in fact, 
not less than a century before, such a justification had began to be replaced 
by the theory of the mixed government. According to such a theory – which, 
originally developed by Polybius, had been resumed in the 17
th century by 
British Whig thinkers – the upper chamber served to bring into the legislative 
process that compound of principles (monarchic, aristocratic and democratic) 
 
 
36   Wood, The Creation …, 556. 
37   Ibid., 558. 
38   Elaine Swift, The Making of an American Senate: Reconstitutive Change in Congress, 1787-1841 
(University of Michigan Press, Chicago, 1996). 
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over which every good Constitution had to be based.
39 In this light, the 
representation of the aristocracy was no longer an end per se (meaning that 
the aristocracy had to be represented so that the aristocracy’s privileges 
could be more secure), but rather a means whose aim was to contribute to 
the general interest of the people (which would benefit from the mixed 
government). 
Americans had imported this theory from Europe during the 18
th century, 
mostly through the work of Montesquieu, and had adapted it to their peculiar 
political situation. In particular, although they accepted the principle of 
compound government, they also strongly rejected the idea that it required 
some concessions to the much hatred aristocratic principle. 
What Americans Whig theorists wanted, in other terms, was an upper 
chamber which could work as a bulwark against the excesses of democracy, 
and particularly of popular transient impressions – as part of that system of 
check and balances which they were beginning to consider the true essence of 
the new, republican government. Yet, they wanted an institution which did 
not entail the admission of privileges on the basis of birth, as it was the case 
with the British House of Lords. But if the upper chamber was to represent the 
people, just as the lower chamber, how could it effectively restrain the 
people’s impulses? 
How to combine these two needs? How, in other terms, to build a truly 
American House of Lords? When the Convention of Philadelphia met in 1787, 
such questions had long been answered. It is in fact not enough stressed that, 
at the time of the Convention, eleven of the thirteen former colonies had 
already adopted a bicameral legislature
40. The eleven Constitutions provided 
the Framers with all the material which was necessary to solve the problem. 
The basic idea had been offered by the progressive discovery of the non-
neutral nature of representation. If both chambers had to represent the 
 
 
39   See Donald Shell, “The History of Bicameralism”, 7(1) The Journal Of Legislative Studies (2001), 7; 
Tsebelis and Money, Bicameralism …, 19-20. 
40   The exceptions were Georgia and Pennsylvania, which adopted bicameralism respectively in 1789 
and in 1790; on this, see Thomas Moran, The Rise and Development of the Bicameral System in 
America (John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1895). The prevalence of bicameralism at the sub-national 
level (which still resists, with Nebraska being the only unicameral State) differentiate the U.S. from 
almost all of the other federations, which is a further proof that the rationale for bicameralism in 
that country was never predominantly federalism. The only other federal countries with sub-
national bicameral legislatures are Australia (all of the six states were bicameral before Queensland 
turned to unicameralism in 1997), Argentina (8 provinces out of 24) and India (5 states out of 25). 
Germany’s Land of Bavaria was considered as having a bicameral legislature until it abolished its 
upper chamber in 1998; nonetheless, the organ’s parliamentary nature was disputed, for it more 
strongly resembled a powerful economic-social council (an institution which is common in the 
tradition of European and especially German-based democracies). On the topic, see: André Malamud 
and Martín Costanzo, Subnational Bicameralism, The Argentine Case in Comparative Perspective 
(Proceedings of the 19
th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, 29 June –
 4 July, Durban, 2003). 
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people, in fact, this did not imply that they had to do so the precise same 
way: second chambers could therefore carry a representation which would 
differ not in nature, but in quality from that of popular chambers. Therefore, 
they could still help to exercise a restraint on the popular will. 
In particular, the solutions were: a) a long tenure of office and the indirect 
election (or elections with higher wealth requirements, or larger 
constituencies), which served to protect Senators from popular transient 
impressions; b) the staggered term, which prevented constant waves of new, 
inexperienced components; c) the small number of members, which was 
crucial to make every Senator more responsible and to avoid the creation of 
factions; d) a series of special competences, which – by bringing the second 
chamber closer to the executive – served to make it perceive itself as the true 
depository of the State’s supreme interests. 
In this respect, a particularly interesting example is that of the Senate of 
Maryland. Its 15 members were chosen by a body of great electors, which on 
their part were elected by the people at large in number of two per county, 
regardless of the population. This scheme, writes Wood, “soon came to 
represent form many the best method of isolating the social elite”.
41 The 
similarity with the US Senate is striking. 
The influence which such provisions exerted over the choices of 
Philadelphia is enormous. The name Senate itself – which incidentally is the 
definitive sign of the classical, rather than federal, ascendancy of the 
institution – was taken directly from the states’ upper houses (in particular, 
probably, from that of New York), and accepted by the Convention apparently 
without a discussion.
42 
The member of the Convention who most vocally advocated the mixed-
government justification of bicameralism was James Madison, ironically the 
same one who would later link his name to the Senate’s disguising re-
interpretation as the confederal branch of the government. In particular, 
Madison adjusted the mixed-government theory to one of the most important 
postulates of his philosophy, i.e. the need for a protection against 
“factionalism.” 
Federalist n. 10 famously defines factions as “a number of citizens, 
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united 
and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to 
the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of 
 
 
41   Wood, The Creation …, 214. 
42   The name Senate first appears in the Convention’s Records of 31 May, as emerges from Farrand, The 
Records …, 51. 
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the community.”
43 At least as famously, Madison claimed that the main 
protection against factionalism came from a truly republican – as opposed to 
democratic – government, i.e. one in which the power was held by a 
representative body rather than by the people at large. 
Of course, not every possible representative body would work to Madison’s 
scope, since even a representative body could yield to factionalism. In 
particular, “a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free 
from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to 
possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority by a 
tenure of considerable duration.”
44 
Autonomy from the people (to be obtained through long tenure of office 
and possibly indirect elections), and possession of great wisdom (to be 
obtained through small number of members and the self-perception as the 
true depository of the state’s highest interest): these were the two most 
fundamental features Madison was looking for. At the same time, he was of 
course aware that both the dependency of the legislature on the people and 
its large composition were essential instruments which it would be neither 
possible nor safe to eliminate. How to reconcile such opposing needs? 
It is as an answer to that question that Madison and the Federalist, on the 
example set by the state Constitutions, designed the US Senate. It is therefore 
not surprising that they did not set up any of the instruments which would 
have allowed senators to be true representatives of the states interests: the 
only function that the states and the state elections had to perform was to 
give legitimacy to the institution. But apart from that, no other link was 
necessary. 
In conclusion, so, the Framers delineated a Senate patently unsuitable to 
work as a clearing house for state interests essentially because they did not 
want it to perform that function. They “intended and expected senators to be 
national legislators, not primarily representatives of state interests.”
45 It was 
only because of political, contingent reasons that they were forced to forge 
the theory of the Senate as the representative of the confederal branch 
within the Union. 
Unfortunately, though, thanks in part to the success of the theory of 
federalism as a median form of government between the unitary state and the 
confederacy, and in part to the incredible fame that the Senate gained, this 
 
 
43   Hamilton, Madison and Jay, The Federalist …, 72. 
44   Ibid., 377. 
45   Lee and Oppenheimer, Sizing Up …, 24. 
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reinterpretation definitively displaced, especially in the eyes of foreigners, 
the Senate’s original ratio. 
The problems arose when more and more countries began to build their 
federal chambers on the US model, on the wrong assumption – shared by many 
theorists of federalism – that this would provide them with an effective 
instrument for the representation of the regional interests, thanks in part to 
E.R.R. and in part to the indirect election. Unfortunately, though, none of 
these features could oppose the intrinsic tendency of the senatorial chamber 
to evolve into a fully nationalized institution, since such a tendency was 
ultimately due to a simple factor: that the institution had been designed 
precisely to that end. 
5. Federalism, Federal Chambers and the Party System 
According to the results of paragraph 4, the crisis of senatorial chambers is 
not only intrinsic to their institutional model, but also, in a sense, intentional. 
In other terms, the phenomenon by which the federal chambers’ members 
tend to become national legislators, rather than representatives of the states, 
is determined by the fact that such chambers were modeled on an institution 
which was purposely designed to encourage that trend. 
At this point, one could probably conclude that – as many propose – the 
only solution to the senatorial chambers’ crisis is their substitution with many 
Bundesrat-like institutions. That conclusion is profoundly mistaken: on a 
closer analysis, in fact, it is clearly founded upon an illegitimate link between 
the thesis that the senatorial chamber cannot work as a clearing hose for 
regional interests (which has been proven true) and the completely different 
thesis that the senatorial chamber simply cannot work. Which instead not only 
has not been proven, but – as we will show – cannot be proven at all. 
After all, the point on which we have concentrated so far, i.e. that 
senatorial chambers cannot perform that function simply and only because 
they were not originally intended to do so, should do nothing but convince us 
that these institutions might instead work well to some other end – and that 
consequently, maybe they should not simply be abolished, after all. 
The question, therefore, is: can the senatorial chamber perform some 
function other than that of a clearing house? Our hypothesis is that it can; to 
see why, we must move our focus from the analysis of the relation between 
federalism and bicameralism to that of the relation between each of them 
and another crucial factor: political parties. 
Let us now turn to the second side of our triangle: the relation between 
federalism and political parties. 
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That political parties strongly influence the functioning of the system of 
government, is a common assumption of political science
46 (which, in a sense, 
dates back to James Madison, as we incidentally saw in paragraph 4). That in 
particular the advent of mass - based, institutionalized parties – or, in the 
words of Giovanni Sartori
47, the structuration of the party system – has posed a 
serious threat to the machinery of constitutionalism developed in the 18
th and 
19
th centuries, is at least as recognized. 
As a part of that machinery
48, federalism has of course not been immune 
from such a threat
49. In particular, what has been especially crucial in re-
shaping federalism is the introduction of a para-hierarchic relation between 
the national and regional political personnel, which has usually accompanied 
the advent of mass-based parties. 
In fact, if federalism was essentially developed in an age when the holders 
of national and peripheral offices were supposed to have nothing more than 
institutional contacts, such a bucolic picture seems plainly risible to a 
contemporary observer. Although of course no worldwide (or even western-
worldwide) generalization is possible, because of the difference between the 
several countries’ party systems, it is a fact that the advent of mass-based 
political parties has created a central body of party functionaries (up to the 
party’s secretary) whose control over the periphery, although exerted through 
incentives and stimuli which constitutional law for the most ignores, is 
probably more extended than that of any officeholder under the 18
th century 
scheme of government. 
The source of such a control lies essentially in the crucial aspect of the 
cursus honorum of the political personnel. It is in fact a quite common 
experience that the ambitions of party members go from bottom to top, 
meaning that those who operate at a local or regional level aim sooner or 
later to enter the national political competition. As a consequence, since it is 
usually the central party structure that holds the key to most relevant 
national seats, it is almost impossible for regional officeholders not to submit 
to the indications they receive from the center. 
 
 
46   This is also true of legal doctrine. See in particular Levinson Daryl and Richard Pildes, “Separation 
of Parties, not Powers”, 119 Harvard Law Review (2006), 2312-2386. 
47   “A party system becomes structured when the elector does not follow a notable anymore, but is 
oriented towards an abstract party image, or towards the ideologies which animate the parties. 
Concretely, a party system is structured in presence of mass parties.” Giovanni Sartori, Elementi …, 
343. 
48    The link between federalism and constitutionalism is extremely limpidly analyzed by Guido de 
Vergottini, “Stato federale”, in Enciclopedia del Diritto. Vol. 43 (1990), 832. 
49   On the importance of political parties in shaping the functioning of federalism, see Friedrich Carl, 
Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1968). 
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This trend is of course neither irresistible nor common to every country. In 
particular, a crucial factor against it is the common experience of the 
personalization of the regional politics around the figure of the regional 
President. Although this phenomenon has sometimes been regarded as a 
pathology of federalism, and as an instance of the contemporary tendency 
towards charismatic politics, it still presents some undeniably positive effects: 
in fact, by granting to the top regional office such a strong visibility, it 
creates a figure which can appropriately complete the cursus honorum of the 
regional personnel, diminishing its tendency to look at the center to find an 
outlet for its ambitions. 
But the strongest factor against such a trend still lies in the nature of a 
Country’s party system. If parties are strongly centralized and strongly 
structured, no instrument such as the personalization of regional politics will 
avoid the accretion of the national control over the periphery. If instead the 
party system is sufficiently decentralized (i.e. defined over local cleavages, to 
the limit of the presence of region-based parties) and non-structured (i.e. not 
articulated on a hierarchic model) federalism will still have hope to keep 
working; or at least, if one finds a value judgment to be out of place, to keep 
working according to its 18
th and 19
th century original scheme.
50 
If this is so, the examination of the other side of the triangle – the relation 
between  federal chambers and the party system – acquires an unexpected 
importance. In what way do federal chambers affect the nature of party 
systems? Do they help to keep it decentralized and destructurized? Or do they 
contribute to its centralization and structuration? Or are they simply neutral? 
These questions will occupy us through the rest of the paragraph. First, we 
will analyze the impact on party systems of the German Bundesrat and 
generally of the ambassadorial model; second, we will focus on the case of 
the US Senate (for now, we will instead leave aside the senatorial chambers of 
the other countries, which – having grown into mere copies of the national 
chambers – basically had no influence at all on their party systems). 
5.1. The Bundesrat and the German Party System 
If it is true that – contrary to the other federal chambers – the Bundesrat has 
essentially maintained its role as a true representative of Länders’ interests, 
and that it has gained an importance which the Framers in 1947 had probably 
not even anticipated, it is also true that all of this came with a price. 
 
 
50   See Elazar, Exploring …, 178; Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, Democracy and the American 
Party System (Harcourt Brace Workd, New York, 1956). 
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It is in fact commonly acknowledged that the increased importance of the 
Bundesrat
51 has had the side-effect of significantly nationalizing the Länder’s 
elections, by giving them an immediate national impact: in fact, the German 
electors know even too well that when they elect the Länder’s governments 
they are also slightly, but often significantly, changing the equilibrium within 
the national government, and they act consequently. 
This has resulted in the regional elections having been loaded with an 
incredible national visibility, with party leaders’ appearances during the 
campaigns of even the smallest Länder. As a consequence, such elections have 
seen the electorate essentially divided over national issues rather than over 
local matters. 
The effect has been of the greatest importance: in fact, by preventing local 
cleavages to emerge, the link between the Länder’s and the Bundesrat’s 
elections has strongly contributed to the centralization of the German party 
system, which on its part is a key feature to explain the German tendency 
towards an entanglement of the several levels of government. This has been 
particularly true of the years after the German reunification, when the 
dissolution of the two-and-a-half party system has made the support of the 
Bundesrat even more fundamental for the government, giving its election an 
even increased importance. In this sense, the reform of 2006, which aims 
among the other things to reduce the Bundesrat’s influence by redefining the 
criterion identifying the areas of legislation over which it has an absolute veto 
power, can be interpreted as a way to reply to that tendency. 
This being said, to the scope of our analysis it is crucial to understand 
whether the party-centralizing role played by the German Bundesrat 
ultimately depends on a specific feature of that particular institution or can 
instead be considered as a standard by-product of every ambassadorial 
chamber. If the latter were the case, we would be justified in claiming that: 
although the ambassadorial model is a very federalism-enhancing tool, when 
regarded as a means to provide a clearing house for regional interests; when 
instead it is regarded from the point of view of its effect on the party system, 
paradoxically it proves to be a strongly anti-federal institution. 
To some extent, one could say that the party-centralizing effect of the 
German Bundesrat depend on some of its peculiar feature. It is undeniable 
that the obviously excessive powers granted to (or acquired by) the Bundesrat 
have strongly contributed to make that mechanism start in the first place 
 
 
51    Today the Bundesrat exercises an absolute veto p o w e r  o v e r  s l i g h t l y  l e s s  t h a n  6 0 %  o f  t h e  t o t a l  
number of bills. The constitutional reform approved in July, 2006 should probably reduce that 
percentage to around 20-30%. On the topic, see Jens Woelk, “La riforma del sistema federale 
tedesco: riuscito il primo atto”, federalismi.it (2006), at http://www.federalismi.it. 
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(excessive importance of the Bundesrat  → nationalization of Länders’ 
elections → centralization of the party system). 
Yet, on a more fundamental level, it seems that the original sin is in the 
model rather than in its application. After all, in fact, its precise theoretical 
basis is that federalism works better if the two levels of government are 
entangled: it is therefore certainly not surprising that the parties’ levels get 
entangled too. The problem arises – one could say – by the combination of the 
two effects: in fact, the entangling effect on the institutional level and the 
entangling effect on the party system, combined together, seem to pose a 
fatal threat to federalism. 
At the same time, it is important to stress that entanglement does not 
necessarily mean centralization. In other terms, the fact that the blurred 
distinction between the two parties’ levels ended up strengthening the 
central rather than the peripheral one, was probably due essentially to the 
specific nature of the German party system. Most likely, in presence of a 
previously highly decentralized party system, the introduction of a very strong 
ambassadorial chamber would have ended up having the very opposite effect: 
rather than submitting the periphery to the center, it would have submitted 
the center to the periphery. In fact, it would have prevented the usual 
phenomenon by which, after the formation of a federal country, the party 
leaderships become more and more centralized because of the necessities of 
the unitary government. 
This specification accounts for the effect that a strong ambassadorial 
chamber has played in that peculiar proto-federal country which is the EU In 
fact, the retention of virtually all the centralized powers in the hands of the 
Council (and of the European Council) has made it possible for the national 
political personnel to keep all of their strength, avoiding precisely the above 
phenomenon to take place. As a consequence, no truly pan-European parties 
and pan-European public opinion have developed – an absence which still 
marks the real difference between the EU and a true federal system. 
Drawing on the above cases, then, we can make the following final 
generalization concerning the potential effects of the adoption of an 
ambassadorial chamber on a country’s party system: the ambassadorial 
chamber prevents the two levels of government to initiate potentially 
different party dynamics; it would make either the periphery dependent on a 
centralized party system or the center dependent on a peripheralized party 
system. In both cases, its negative impact on the functionality of federalism – 
from this perspective – is undeniable. 
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5.2. The Senate and the US Party System 
The situation appears almost reverse when we move to the archetype of the 
ambassadorial model to that of the senatorial one. Perfectly in line with 
Madison’s hopes, in fact, the US Senate seems to have played a significant 
role in de-centralizing and de-structuring the American party system. So, even 
though it has not prove to be an effective instrument for the representation 
and compensation of the state interests, apparently the Senate ultimately had 
a positive impact on preservation of the functionality of US federalism.
52 
That the US party system is highly decentralized and non-structured, is a 
well-known fact. Even more, it has been suggested that it is precisely this 
peculiarity that has made it possible for the institutional design of 
Philadelphia to keep working for over two centuries. The long series of failed 
attempts to export that model have in fact made it clear that neither 
presidentialism nor a true federalism can work in presence of a structured 
and/or centralized party system.
53 
Of course, the decentralized and non-structured nature of the US party 
system is not entirely imputable to the Framers’ design: the way party 
systems evolve obviously depends for the most on factors which fall short of 
anybody’s control. Yet, this does not mean that there are no instruments for 
influencing at least the general trend of this evolution. 
Among such instruments, the most famous are of course the electoral laws – 
but they are by no means the only one. In particular, among the factors 
contributing to maintain the US party system non-structured and non-
centralized, we can mention
54: 1) the monocratic nature of the executive, 
which has prevented the emergence of that web of affiliations based on the 
distribution of governing seats which is crucial for the birth of structured 
political parties; 2) the federal government, which has made it possible for 
regional  cleavages  to keep their strength; 3) the primary system, which – 
along with the first-past-the-post election – has coerced ideologically distant 
groups into getting united. 
But it seems possible to say that the Senate itself has played an important 
role. To understand in what sense, we must go back to the reason why the 
structuration and centralization of a party system ends up having a negative 
impact on federalism. As we noted before, the key factor beneath this 
negative impact is the insurgence of a para-hierarchic relation between the 
regional political personnel and the central party structures; as we have also 
 
 
52   Riker, The Development …, 218. 
53   Giovanni Sartori, Ingegneria costituzionale comparata (Il Mulino, Bologna, 1995), 191. 
54   Fred W. Riggs, “The Survival of Presidentialism in America”, 9 International Political Science 
Review (1988), 254. 
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said, this, on its part, depend on the fact that if the former wants to progress 
in its cursus honorum, it necessarily has to obtain the consent of the latter – 
which means that it has to abdicate some of its independence. 
In this context, the importance of the Senate lies in the fact that it 
introduces a national seat which is at the same time of crucial importance and 
obtainable only through the political action at the state level. Even more, the 
fact that such a seat has gradually become the most revered and sought-after 
among all national posts (except of course for the Presidency, for which – 
though – the senatorial bench has proven to be a good springboard) has 
strongly helped the state party levels to keep their key role in American 
politics. 
To some extent, and taking into consideration that the Senate is just one of 
the factors beneath such a process, one could say that the relation of political 
dependence between the periphery and the center of political parties that we 
described earlier, in the US operates backwards. It is in fact the central 
political personnel that is bound to maintain a strong link with the party’s 
state level and with the state public opinion, if it wants to arrive to the most 
important step of its political career. 
In this sense, so, we can say that, even though indirectly, the US Senate 
has played a major federal role. It did so particularly thanks to two of its 
characteristics: 
1) the senatorial seat is a crucial national post, which can constitute the 
acme for the career of the political personnel. This characteristic, on its part, 
depends on three features of the Senate: is small number of members, the 
long and staggered term and the special competences. If it had not been for 
those features – unsurprisingly, the same ones that, as we noted earlier, 
Madison strongly advocated –the Senate would have probably ended up playing 
no role at all in this game; 
2) the senatorial election has stayed primarily a matter of state politics. 
This key element depended essentially on the monocratic election of senators 
and on the state-large constituencies: in fact, on the one hand, they have 
prevented central parties from becoming overly important in the choice of the 
candidates; on the other hand, they have given the competition a regional 
relevance which has strongly contributed to its being played essentially over 
regional topics or over regional approaches to national topics. 
6. To Make the Senatorial Chamber Work 
Paragraph 5, which has turn our analysis to the topic of party systems and 
their relations with federalism and federal bicameralism, has arrived to two 
important conclusions: 
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1) although the ambassadorial chamber is extremely effective as an 
instrument of intergovernmental confrontation, and therefore can strongly 
enhance the efficacy of federalism on the institutional level, it exerts an 
undeniably negative impact on the level of the party system. In fact, it 
contributes to entangle the central and regional party structures, with the 
result of either making the latter depending on the former or vice versa; 
2) the archetype of senatorial chambers – the US Senate – is not as neutral 
with regards to federalism as we had concluded during our earlier analysis of 
institutional mechanics. In fact, by offering the regional political personnel 
the possibility to achieve a national crucial seat without having to submit to 
the central party structures, it strongly contributes to maintain the 
functionality of American federalism. 
Let us focus on this latter point. We began paragraph 5 by asking whether it 
is possible that, although unable to work as a clearing house for regional 
interests, a senatorial chamber could still perform some other federal 
function. To this we must now answer in the positive: at least one of the 
senatorial chambers – their archetype, to be sure – has in fact performed 
some other federal function, i.e. it has contributed to the decentralization 
and destructuration of the US party system. 
This raises a further question: is it possible for the other senatorial 
chambers, which instead appears to have been simply useless, to perform that 
function? The answer seems to be positive. As we stated earlier, in fact, the 
ability to perform that function depends essentially on a very small number of 
features which characterize the US Senate but were not adopted by the other 
countries, probably because they were misled by the idea of the Senate as the 
representative of the confederal root of the Union. That mistake, though, is 
not irreversible. 
What conditions must therefore a senatorial chamber satisfy in order for it 
to work as a party-decentralizing and party-destructuring institution? It must 
simply be an effective and appropriate outlet for the ambitions of the 
regional political personnel. More precisely: 
1) it must be an effective outlet, meaning that the elections of its members 
must stay primarily a matter of regional relevance (even though, as we have 
long established, they will ultimately operate entirely as national legislators, 
not as representatives of regional interests). How to achieve this goal? 
Different solutions can be developed, apart from the US option for a 
monocratic election in state large districts. For instance, the elections for 
each regional senatorial delegation can be held separately, together with 
those of each regional government; this would probably increase the 
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importance local cleavages and decrease the influence of central party 
organizations. 
2) it must be an appropriate outlet, meaning that the senatorial seat must 
be regarded as sufficiently important, so that it can constitute the crowning 
achievement for the regional political personnel. In order for this to be 
achieved, senators must be granted the strongest possible autonomy from 
parties, from the first chamber and from the executive. 
How can this second result be obtained? There can be several ways, and it 
is neither useful nor possible to enumerate them. There is only one point that 
needs to be stressed: autonomy does not necessarily mean power. On the 
contrary, if the chamber’s powers are so vast that it becomes concretely 
impossible to govern without it or against it, the chamber’s elections will 
inevitably assume a strong national connotation that will erase whatever 
regionalization one may try to achieve. Of course, it is also true that 
autonomy requires authority: if the powers granted to the federal chambers 
are so feeble that it becomes nothing more than an advisory council, it will be 
impossible for it to play any significant role on the party system. 
The problem, thus, is to find the right balance between autonomy and 
authority: the chamber and its members must be sufficiently strong to be 
relevant, but not so strong that they are bound to cooperate with the 
system.
55 In this sense, the only possible suggestion for the quest of such a 
balance is that it might be found in the formula of few powers, but deep 
powers: the senatorial chamber could in fact be usefully stripped of its 
powers over ordinary legislation, so that it would be possible to govern against 
it; but, at the same time, it could be granted the last word within some 
specific fields which do not fall within the area of the normal executive’s 
activity, such as extraordinary legislation, constitutional laws or appointments 
for guarantee institutions. 
 
 
55   According to Bruce Ackerman, “The New Separation of Powers”, 113 Harvard Law Review (2000), 
633-727, at 671, the search for that balance is made easier in the U.S. by presidentialism, since the 
risk of divided government is interiorized by such a system, thanks to the areas of relative 
reciprocal independence of the executive and the legislative. At the opposite, regimes such as 
parliamentary democracies, which – at least in theory – do not admit the possibility of divided 
government, should be on full alert against granting excessive powers to the federal chamber. They 
should content themselves with “one and a half houses.” Although the analysis is undoubtedly 
convincing, it might be useful to stress that – even more than the alternative 
presidentialism/parliamentarism – what seems to truly count here is, once again, the alternative 
between countries with/without a structured party system. It is in fact highly doubtable that even 
the U.S. system of government could work with a different majority in each house, in presence of a 
strongly structured party system. 
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7. Conclusion 
The results of our analysis can be summed up as follows: 
1) beneath the name of federal chamber we have discovered the existence 
of two, different institutions: the senatorial chamber (whose members are not 
linked by any mandate or instruction to the regional governments) and the 
ambassadorial chamber (whose members are instead essentially ambassadors 
of those governments); 
2) although both institutions are nowadays required to perform the same 
function, i.e. that of providing a place where the diverging interests of the 
regions can be expressed and composed, only the ambassadorial chamber was 
originally intended as aimed to that end. On the contrary, the senatorial 
chamber was initially created in the US to a very different scope: that of 
providing a bulwark against the risks of politics being dominated by parties. It 
is in this divergence between ends and means that lies the root of the crisis of 
the senatorial chambers: they are required to perform a certain function, but 
are based on an institutional model which was instead intended to perform a 
different one; 
3) since the trend towards parties’ structuration and centralization poses a 
crucial threat to federalism, and since the senatorial chamber appears to 
weaken that trend (by offering a national outlet to the ambitions of the 
regional political personnel), in the end it is possible to say that such an 
institution does in fact perform a federal function. On the contrary, the 
ambassadorial chamber, by favoring an entanglement of the regional and 
central levels of political parties, can in the end seriously curtail the 
autonomy of either one of the two levels, and so, from this point of view, can 
be negative for federalism. 
At this point, one may ask: in conclusion, what way should we choose to 
solve the crisis of senatorial chambers? Should we simply turn them into many 
Bundesrat-like institutions? Or should we instead accept that they cannot 
seriously work as representatives of the regional interests, and change them 
on the model of the US Senate, so to have them perform at least the party-
decentralizing and party-destructuring function? There is no single answer. 
What is important is to clearly state the ends we are pursuing, and be 
consequent: 
1) if we care the most about the efficacy of the governmental activity, we 
should simply turn to the Bundesrat. In fact, an ambassadorial chamber, by 
working as an effective clearing house for regional interests, can reduce the 
conflicts and costs arising by the lack of inter-governmental coordination. At 
the same time, we must be aware that this choice, by making the regional 
and central party levels basically one and the same, can seriously reduce the 
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possibility for regional politics to develop any autonomous dynamics, and 
therefore, in perspective, can seriously curtail the level of diversity within the 
country. At the very least, since this phenomenon increases in line with the 
extension of the veto powers granted to the federal chamber, this 
consideration should make us skeptical about too strongly expand those 
powers, on the false but common premise that this would help federalism to 
work better. 
2) if instead we care the most about the level of autonomy and diversity 
that federalism enhances, we should definitively reject the Bundesrat model. 
In this case, though, rather than simply keeping an ineffective senatorial 
chamber, it would probably be useful to change it in the direction described 
in paragraph 6 (to make it be an effective and appropriate outlet for the 
ambitions of the regional political personnel), so to have it work as a party-
decentralizing and party-destructuring instrument. This, of course, also comes 
with a price: in particular, such a price consists of the raise in the costs of 
federalism, which would arise out of the increased political autonomy of the 
sub-national units, and out of the lack of a place where the differences can be 
expressed and reduced to unity. 
The choice seems in other terms to depend ultimately on which value is 
given the strongest importance: efficacy of the governmental activity or 
autonomy and differentiation. In the end, thus, we have been apparently led 
to one of the most fundamental distinctions within the federal thought: that 
between “federalism as a means” and “federalism as an end”, in the accurate 
definition of Daniel Elazar
56. On the one side, there stand those who support 
federalism because it increases the total welfare of the society, by bringing 
the public response closer to the interests which have activated it. This 
interpretation – which is today particularly widespread, as it is shown by the 
diffusion of the idea that federalism can be reduced to the subsidiarity 
principle – quite obviously leads to a preference for the ambassadorial model, 
which enhances the functionality of the governmental activity at the cost of a 
diminution in the level of peripheral autonomy and internal differentiation. 
On the other side, there stand those who support federalism on the 
assumption that differentiation is good per se, either because of a religious or 
metaphysical belief, or on the premise that, on the long term, it is more 
useful to the society than uniformity. It is to this theoretical approach that we 
can ultimately ascribe the senatorial model, with its stress on the 
preservation of the regional autonomy, even at the cost of a decrease in the 
total efficacy of the governmental activity. 
 
 
56   Elazar, Exploring …, 81. 
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